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Reliability assessment of passive safety systems is one of the important issues, since
safety of advanced nuclear reactors rely on several passive features. In this context, a few
methodologies such as reliability evaluation of passive safety system (REPAS), reliability
methods for passive safety functions (RMPS), and analysis of passive systems reliability
(APSRA) have been developed in the past.These methodologies have been used to assess
reliability of various passive safety systems. While these methodologies have certain fea-
tures in common, but they differ in considering certain issues; for example, treatment of
model uncertainties, deviation of geometric, and process parameters from their nominal
values. This paper presents the state of the art on passive system reliability assessment
methodologies, the accomplishments, and remaining issues. In this review, three critical
issues pertaining to passive systems performance and reliability have been identified. The
first issue is applicability of best estimate codes and model uncertainty. The best esti-
mate codes based phenomenological simulations of natural convection passive systems
could have significant amount of uncertainties, these uncertainties must be incorporated
in appropriate manner in the performance and reliability analysis of such systems. The
second issue is the treatment of dynamic failure characteristics of components of pas-
sive systems. REPAS, RMPS, and APSRA methodologies do not consider dynamic failures
of components or process, which may have strong influence on the failure of passive
systems.The influence of dynamic failure characteristics of components on system failure
probability is presented with the help of a dynamic reliability methodology based on Monte
Carlo simulation. The analysis of a benchmark problem of Hold-up tank shows the error in
failure probability estimation by not considering the dynamism of components. It is thus
suggested that dynamic reliability methodologies must be integrated in passive systems
reliability analysis to have a true estimate of system failure probability, and hence the relia-
bility.Third issue is the treatment of independent process parameters variations in passive
system reliability analysis. Certain process parameters such as atmospheric temperature
can vary with time. Performance of some passive safety systems depends on this para-
meter. However, the present methodologies do not consider this dynamic variation from
the nominal values and hence introduce a subject of discussion.
Keywords: passive systems, reliability, REPAS, RMPS, APSRA
INTRODUCTION
Ever since the inception of nuclear fission, nuclear energy is
considered as one of the potential sources of energy for electric-
ity production, which can eliminate or reduce the dependency
of human beings on the conventional sources of energy. Until
December 2013, 434 nuclear reactors are in operations for elec-
tricity production (IAEA, 2014). Nuclear power reactors have two
specific characteristics: first, during their operation, they accumu-
late a large quantity of radioactive fission products from which
the public must be protected. Second, significant energy release
continues for prolonged period due to the decay heat, even after
the reactor is shutdown. Owning to these two specific charac-
teristics of nuclear reactors, they are designed to be equipped
with multiple layers of safety systems to minimize or eliminate
the associated risk to public or to the environment. In the his-
tory of commercial nuclear power plants, there were three major
accidents [at Three Mile Island (1979), Chernobyl (1986), and
Fukushima (2011)] leading to core melt down. Except Three Mile
Island, a large amount of radioactivity was released to the environ-
ment. To eliminate the public concerns on nuclear reactor safety,
several efforts have been made worldwide to change/modify the
designs of nuclear power plants and the regulatory policies. The
safety goals for the future nuclear reactors have been accordingly
enhanced so that significant release of radioactive material to the
environment is practically eliminated and the risk to public due
to nuclear plants is negligibly small. The International Nuclear
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Safety Group (INSAG-12) and INPRO have set the targets of core
damage frequency (CDF) of not more than 10−5/reactor year for
future nuclear power plants in comparison to the present goal of
10−4 for existing plants. The goal for the large early release fre-
quency (LERF) has been enhanced further to 10−6/reactor year in
place of present goal of 10−5/reactor year.
The future reactor concepts are designed on the philosophy
of “safety-by-design” for meeting the enhanced goals of nuclear
safety. These concepts are designed with inherent safety features
so that the reactor has the capability to return to stable safe con-
ditions on its own in the event of any kind of accidents that may
arise due to any internal or external events. Such safety charac-
teristics are paramount important for these future reactors, which
can minimize or eliminate the necessity of evacuation of public
(Nayak and Sinha, 2007). In the current operating reactors, most
of the critical safety functions are provided by using active safety
systems. However, in order to meet the futuristic goals of safety,
relying on these active safety systems alone does not seem to be
viable. One of the major problems with active safety systems is
that the reliability of these systems cannot be improved beyond a
threshold. In addition, these systems are prone to the errors made
by operator’s actions and their subjective decisions. Passive sys-
tems, on the other hand, are believed to be more reliable than the
active safety systems and hence, can provide enhanced protection
against any postulated accidents. This is because passive systems do
not need human intervention or require external energy sources
such as electricity or pneumatic supply for their operation.
IAEA (1991) defines the passive safety system as “A system that
is composed entirely of passive components and structures or a
system, which uses active components in a very limited way to ini-
tiate subsequent passive operation.” As per IAEA-TECDOC-626,
passive safety systems can be categorized into four categories, as
described below.
CATEGORY A
In this category, passive systems do not have moving mechanical
components or parts or any moving working fluids. Also, these
systems do not depend on any external power sources and any
external signal for activation (IAEA, 1991). Some of the exam-
ples of this category of passive safety features are physical barriers
against the release of fission products, such as fuel cladding and
pressure boundary components and systems; core cooling systems
relying on heat transfer by radiation, convection, and conduction
from nuclear fuel to outer structural parts, etc.
CATEGORY B
Unlike category A, these systems have moving working fluids. They
do not need external power sources for their actuation and do not
have moving mechanical components or parts. Examples of this
category of passive safety features are systems operating on natural
circulation.
CATEGORY C
In this category,passive systems can have moving mechanical parts.
The systems may or may not have moving working fluids. These
systems do not depend on any external power sources and any
external signal for activation. Some of the examples of this cate-
gory of passive systems are venting by relief valves or rupture discs
to prevent overpressure; emergency injection systems consisting
of accumulators and check valves.
CATEGORY D
This category of passive systems is characterized by passive execu-
tion and active initiation for their operation. That means external
source of intelligence is required to initiate the process. Opera-
tion followed by the initiation of the process is executed by passive
means. This category draws a border between active and passive
systems. Some of the examples of this category of passive safety
features are emergency core cooling systems (ECCS), which get
activated by electro-pneumatic valves and are based on gravity
driven flow of water, and emergency shutdown systems based on
gravity or static pressure driven control rods, which get activated
by fail-safe trip logic.
Many of the advanced reactors, e.g., ESBWR (Cheung et al.,
1998),AP1000 (Schulz, 2006), CAREM (Delmastro, 2002),AHWR
(Sinha and Kakodkar, 2006) incorporate several passive systems
in the design of the reactors. Below are some of the examples
of advanced water-cooled reactor designs that implement passive
safety systems:
AP600 AND AP1000
The AP600 and AP1000 are PWRs designed by the Westing-
house Electric Corporation. Both designs employ passive safety
systems that rely on gravity, compressed gas, natural circulation,
and evaporation to provide for long-term cooling in the event of
an accident. Various passive safety systems in AP600/AP1000 are
as follows:
• AP1000 passive residual heat removal systems (PRHR),
• AP1000 core make-up tank (CMT),
• AP1000 containment sump recirculation,
• AP1000 passive containment cooling system (PCCS).
ECONOMIC SIMPLIFIED BOILING WATER REACTOR
ESBWR developed by general electric, is based on the previous
simplified boiling water reactor (SBWR) design with some modi-
fications of safety systems and the containment size relative to the
reactor power. In ESBWR concepts, the safety is accomplished by
eliminating the recirculation pump, thus relying on natural circu-
lation cooling. The coolant is circulated by natural circulation as a
result of the density difference between the high void, two-phase
fluid in the chimney, and the exterior single-phase liquid in the
downcomer. The tall chimney not only enhances the natural cir-
culation flow, but also ensures the ample time for core uncovery
before the ECCS comes in play. The emergency core cooling and
containment cooling systems do not have an active pump inject-
ing flows and the cooling flows are driven by pressure differences.
Large volumes of suppression pool functions not only as a primary
heat sink during the initial blow down, but also as coolant inven-
tory to prevent the core uncovery through the gravity equalization
lines. Various passive safety features utilized in the ESBWR are as
follows:
• Gravity driven cooling system,
• Automatic depressurization system (ADS),
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• Isolation condenser system (ICS),
• Standby liquid control system,
• Passive containment cooling system,
• Suppression pool.
ADVANCED HEAVY WATER REACTOR
Advanced heavy water reactor is a vertical, pressure tube type,
heavy water moderated, and boiling light-water-cooled natural
circulation reactor. AHWR employs several passive safety fea-
tures in its design. Various passive safety systems of AHWR are
as follows:
• Passive core cooling system,
• Passive core decay heat removal system (PDHRS),
• Emergency core cooling system in passive mode,
• Passive containment isolation system (PCIS),
• Passive containment cooling system,
• Vapor suppression in GDWP,
• Passive poison injection system.
As said before, deployment of passive systems in nuclear reac-
tors provides several benefits, such as avoidance or dependency
on active components; such systems are simple and easy to build,
operate, and maintain. Elimination of operator intervention or
dependency on external sources results in reduction of respective
hazards.
Despite the above, there are technological challenges and issues
in order to engineer them in the reactor designs. One of the issues
with the passive systems is accurate quantification of functional
reliability for these systems during normal operation and tran-
sients including accidental conditions. These functional failures
are the type of failures, which happens because of deviations in
boundary conditions of the critical process or geometric para-
meters on which passive systems performance depends. This
is because the driving forces in passive systems are relatively
small, and these forces may get affected due to small changes
in operating parameters or geometry of the system. The main
difficulties in evaluation of functional failure of passive systems
arise because of (a) lack of plant operational experience; (b)
scarcity of adequate experimental data from integral test facil-
ities or from separate effect tests in order to understand the
performance characteristics of these passive systems, not only
at normal operation but also during accidents and transients;
(c) lack of accepted definitions of failure modes for these sys-
tems; and (d) difficulty in modeling certain physical behavior of
these systems.
This paper presents the state of the art on passive system reli-
ability assessment, the accomplishments, and remaining issues.
Rest of the article is organized as follows: Section “Passive Sys-
tem Reliability Analysis – State of the Art” brings the state of
the art on passive system reliability analysis. In Section “Accom-
plishments in Passive System Reliability Analysis,” accomplish-
ments in the passive system reliability analysis are discussed.
Section “Unresolved Issues” discusses the unresolved issues asso-
ciated with passive systems performance and reliability assess-
ment. Main conclusions of this study are presented in Section
“Conclusion.”
PASSIVE SYSTEM RELIABILITY ANALYSIS – STATE OF THE
ART
Passive system reliability can be defined as the probability of the
system or structure to carry out the defined function for a given
mission time [0, t], when operated under specified conditions.
The main challenge in defining the reliability of passive system
arises from the fact that operating principles of these passive sys-
tems are based on the physical phenomena like buoyancy, gravity,
or natural convection, rather than being dependent on the active
components. Since, these physical phenomena in itself never fails
as long as the parameters governing them do not deviate from
their nominal values, defining a failure for passive system is indeed
very subjective. For example, in advanced nuclear reactors, ICS is
used to remove the decay heat under station blackout conditions
passively. However, during the operation, the critical process para-
meters, which govern the performance of ICS may deviate from
their nominal values and degrade the heat transfer characteristic
such that ICS fails to meet their desired function satisfactorily,
which can be, to maintain the system pressure in required range
or to keep the clad temperature under certain threshold value.
Reliability analysis of category A passive systems can be carried
out using structural reliability methodologies with sufficient accu-
racy (Burgazzi, 2012). Since passive systems of category C and D
involve many static mechanical components, which are among fre-
quently used components in nuclear power plants, the failure data
of these components can be used to assess the reliability of these
categories of passive systems. However, for category B systems,
research is still in progress to bring a unified and internationally
acceptable methodology.
A historical perspective to this topic reveals that in mid-1990s,
CEA and ENEA agreed to work to evaluate the reliability of pas-
sive systems. In University of Pisa (UNIPI), D’Auria and Galassi
(2000) studied it further and a few years later, this methodol-
ogy was proposed as reliability evaluation of passive safety system
(REPAS). REPAS (Jafari et al., 2003) methodology was a joint effort
of UNIPI, ENEA, University of Rome, and Polytechnic of Milan.
In REPAS, failure probability of passive system was evaluated by
propagating the epistemic uncertainties of important physical and
geometric parameters, which affects the system performance the
most. The REPAS methodology recognizes the model uncertain-
ties of the codes. In REPAS, the uncertainties in code predictions
are evaluated by performing sensitivity study of input parame-
ters and by code to code comparisons. Jafari et al. (2003) applied
this methodology to an experimental natural circulation test loop.
Zio et al. (2003) used REPAS for reliability analysis of an ICS.
A drawback of REPAS was that, in order to assess the impact of
uncertainties on the predicted performance of passive system, a
large number of calculations with best estimate codes were needed.
Thus, the reliability estimation using REPAS was found to be too
expensive in terms of number of code runs, if complete sequences
of passive system involvement are to be considered in the accident
scenario.
Under the auspices of the European 5th Framework pro-
gram, a comprehensive methodology reliability method for passive
safety functions (RMPS) (Marques et al., 2005) was developed.
RMPS inherited the methodological developments of REPAS
and improved upon the shortcomings of it. In RMPS, the most
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important parameters that affect the passive system performance
are identified using analytical hierarchy processes (AHP) and
sensitivity analysis. These important parameters are chosen for
further analysis. A probability distribution function (pdf) of
these input parameters is then assigned by using classical data
fitting techniques (in case of data available about the parame-
ters) or expert judgment processes (in the absence of sufficient
data). Once the distributions for the input parameters are deter-
mined, a Monte Carlo sampling technique is used to sample a
large number of samples for these parameters. The performance
of passive system is then evaluated using best estimate codes
such as RELAP or CATHARE. With the outcome of the results
of these code runs, the probability of passive system failure is
estimated. Various alternative techniques have been proposed in
RMPS methodology to limit the large number of time consum-
ing deterministic code runs. Some of such alternative techniques
include the use of variance reduction techniques, FORM/SORM
(first and second order reliability methods) and use of meta-
models like response surface. Two improvement areas have been
identified for RMPS methodology after its inception and imple-
mentation to various passive systems of water-cooled reactors
based on natural circulation – first, for realistic estimation of
probability density functions of the input parameters, a engi-
neering judgment process needs to be implemented; second, to
assess the impact of uncertainty in these input parameter’s pdfs,
appropriate sensitivity analysis must be incorporated (Burgazzi,
2012).
Using a similar approach, Pagani et al. (2005) evaluated the
probability of failure of the gas-cooled fast reactor (GFR) natural
circulation system. However, they used simpler conservative codes
to evaluate the failure of a system.
In RMPS, the treatment of variations of input parameters is
done by using probability density function (pdf). The analyst has
to have prior information about these pdf. Moreover, functional
failure of passive systems is very much dependent on the values
of these parameters. It is argued here that, the nominal values
of these input parameters cannot have an independent devia-
tion. Since most of the input parameters are linked to states of
hardware components, the variations in the nominal values of
these parameters can be because of failure/malfunctioning of these
components. Hence, assigning arbitrary pdfs for their deviations
are debatable.
A first effort in integrating the passive systems to the prob-
abilistic safety assessment (PSA) was put forward in the RMPS
methodology. According to RMPS methodology, the failure prob-
ability of entire passive system can be achieved by combining (a)
failure of components (hardware failures, i.e., activating valves
and piping failures, etc.) and, (b) functional failure of passive phe-
nomenon, by using an OR gate (Figure 1, step-1). No definitive
agreement was reached within the RMPS project on the way how
to incorporate passive system reliability into a plant-specific PSA
model and only conceptual proposals were provided. However,
the integration of passive system into plant-specific PSA is very
straightforward, this can be done after the failure probability of
passive system is determined. The passive system analyzed can
be incorporated into a plant-specific PSA model by introducing
an additional heading in the respective Event Tree to incorporate
FIGURE 1 | Integration of passive system into plant-specific PSA.
the success or failure of the passive safety system (Figure 1,
step-2). However, implementing the above procedure for the reli-
ability assessment of passive system and for its integration with
plant-specific PSA has certain shortcomings. The following point
summarizes the issues:
• The methodology followed in RMPS, does not account for the
interaction between the (a) hardware/component failure and,
(b) functional failure of passive system. In actual the hard-
ware/component may fail or degrade during the operation of
passive system. It is also possible that functional failure of pas-
sive system, which is attributed to a process parameter deviating
from its nominal values, must have happened because of some
hardware/component’s degradation (e.g., loss in pressure may be
caused by malfunction of some I&C systems or valves). The fault
tree treatment of considering the hardware failure and func-
tional failure of passive phenomenal separately thus seems to be
a subject of improvement.
• The above mentioned event tree treatment of passive system
holds good only for one accident scenario. For each of the dif-
ferent initiating events and accident scenarios, passive system
needs to be analyzed separately and hence would result in a
computationally intensive scheme.
• Instead of following a classical PSA treatment, which is based
on the assumptions of same failure rates of the components
throughout the mission time, a more advanced form of PSA
like living probabilistic safety assessment (LPSA) (Zubair et al.,
2010,2011,2013) can be utilized for implementing risk informed
decision making.
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A different methodology called analysis of passive systems reli-
ability (APSRA) (Nayak et al., 2008) was developed in the year
2007. Unlike RMPS, in APSRA methodology, it is attributed that
the deviations of input parameters on which passive system per-
formance depends, occur only because of malfunction or failure
of mechanical components. In APSRA methodology, first a failure
surface is generated by considering the deviations of all those crit-
ical parameters, which influence the system performance. These
failure surfaces are generated by evaluating the effect of these devi-
ations on passive system performance using qualified T-H codes
(e.g., RELAP, CATHARE). Then root-cause analysis is performed
to find the cause of these deviations. Once the causes of these
deviations are determined, the failure probabilities of these causes
are obtained from generic data values as well as from plant oper-
ational experience data. Finally, the failure probability of passive
system is evaluated using classical PSA techniques like fault tree
analysis. The top event for the fault tree is considered as passive
system functional failures (for example, passive system unable to
maintain the clad temperature below certain threshold) and the
basic events are malfunctioning or failed component states. To
reduce the uncertainty in code predictions, APSRA methodology
suggests relying on experimental data from integral test facilities
as well as from separate effect tests (Nayak et al., 2009). Figure 2
illustrates the steps followed in APSRA methodology.
Apart from RMPS and APSRA methodologies, a few alterna-
tive approaches have been investigated in the area of reliability
assessment of passive systems. In one of the approach developed
at ENEA by Burgazzi (2002), the failure probability of passive
system is linked only to mechanical component failure or degra-
dation and is estimated from the surrogate models by replacing
the T-H codes with fault tree. However, this approach has does
not treat deviation of initial and boundary conditions on passive
system performance and reliability. Moreover, surrogate models
used in this approach fails to capture the interactions among
physical phenomena. In another approach, Burgazzi (2007) pro-
posed to predict, the probability of failure of passive system by
multiplying the probability of independent failure modes. Only
those failure modes were considered, which had the potential to
deviate from their nominal conditions or physical mechanisms,
which in turn may deviate the passive system performance. This
approach may result in providing very conservative estimates of
failure probability.
COMPARISON BETWEEN RMPS AND APSRA METHODOLOGIES
While both RMPS and APSRA have certain features in common,
for example;
• Both methodologies require best estimate codes to find the
T-H performance of the passive systems and the influence of
sensitive parameters (including process parameters and model
uncertainties) on the system performance.
• Both methodologies define T-H failure criteria of the system.
• Both methodologies use probabilistic and deterministic tools to
assess the reliability of the system.
FIGURE 2 |The APSRA methodology.
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However, they differ in certain aspects, which are as follows:
• One of the biggest differences between RMPS and APSRA is
the way both the methods treat the process parameter variation
from its nominal value. In RMPS, variation of process parame-
ters is considered through a pdf treatment. For example, the
reactor has a nominal operating pressure, which can vary within
a range of pressure control system. This variation can be treated
by assigning a uniform distribution. APSRA, however, tackles
these variations by considering the root diagnosis for example,
the variation of pressure from the nominal value could be due
to malfunction of the pressure control system, which is basically
failure of a hardware system.
• Second difference between RMPS and APSRA is the way both
methodologies treat model uncertainties. RMPS treats model
uncertainties using pdf similar to process parameter variations
and it does not distinguish between the process parameter varia-
tions and model uncertainties. On the other hand, APSRA relies
on uncertainty estimates of computer codes from experimental
validation. In the absence of experimental data, APSRA treats
the model uncertainties using a pdf and they are propagated
separately after evaluating the failure probability of the system
through failure of process parameters.
• Third difference between RMPS and APSRA is the way of eval-
uating the reliability of passive systems. RMPS uses Monte
Carlo evaluation or FORM/SORM (first/second order reliability
methods), whereas APSRA predicts failure surface and evaluates
reliability using fault tree analysis.
ACCOMPLISHMENTS IN PASSIVE SYSTEM RELIABILITY
ANALYSIS
The above methodologies REPAS, RMPS, and APSRA have uncov-
ered very important aspects related to passive safety system reli-
ability. Following are noticeable accomplishments of the above
methods:
• Definition of reliability of passive system: both the method-
ologies have a common opinion on the definition of reliability
of passive system. Accordingly, passive system reliability can be
defined as the probability of system or structure to carry out the
defined function (like – decay heat removal, cooling of vessel,
keeping clad temperature in a defined range, etc) for a given
mission time [0, t ], when operated under specified conditions.
• It has been accepted by all the methods that passive system per-
formance and reliability are functions of boundary conditions.
Their deviations from the designed nominal conditions could
affect the performance and hence reliability. This is true in case
of passive systems because of the low driving forces.
• It is also accepted that input parameters and boundary condi-
tions vary between some limits. Some of these parameters and
boundary conditions are critical for passive system performance.
Key to quantify reliability lies in understanding the deviations
and their effects on system performance during the operation
and transient conditions. To name a few of initial and boundary
conditions are – pressure, water level, reactor power, environ-
ment temperature, etc. and some of physical parameters like
densities, conductivity, specific heats of fuel, etc.
• In all the methods, defining failure of passive system is given
the prime importance and it can be concluded that most of
them have defined it as either fail to meet the amount of heat
exchanged or to keep maximal clad temperature in a safe range
during the operation.
• Since there is limited experience in the operation of passive sys-
tems and lack of suitable experimental databases, all the methods
rely on simulation by means of best estimate codes like RELAP5
or CATHARE.
UNRESOLVED ISSUES
The above methodologies lack to explain some of the impor-
tant issues related to passive systems performance and reliability
analysis. These issues are as follows:
APPLICABILITY OF BEST ESTIMATE CODES AND MODEL UNCERTAINTY
It is so far not established whether the so called best estimate codes
such as RELAP5 or CATHARE, are applicable for passive systems
performance evaluation and their failure. Of course, these codes
have been validated over several years using test data from sep-
arate effect facilities and integral experiments and it is now well
recognized that they are acceptable for conventional water-cooled
reactors, which have active safety systems. However, to use such
best estimate codes for passive systems is still doubtful.
Why the current codes may not be applicable to passive
systems?
Passive system such as natural circulation systems mostly has
low driving force. Because of the low driving forces, the flow may
not be fully developed. Besides, the natural convection flow veloc-
ities can be multidimensional in nature unlike the 1-D flow, which
the above codes assume. In addition, in some of the passive decay
heat removal systems involving large diameter vessels or pools,
which remove the heat by natural convection, there can be exis-
tence of thermal stratification in the pools. In such systems, the
high density of fluid may settle at the bottom of the vessel and
the low-density fluid sits at the top allowing kettle type boiling
when heat addition takes place. Besides, heat transfer and pressure
loss laws developed for the forced circulation systems may not be
applicable to natural circulation based systems. It is thus difficult
to accurately model the above phenomena of these passive sys-
tems, which strongly affect the system performance and failure. As
a result, phenomenological simulations of such natural convection
systems could have significant amount of uncertainties, particu-
larly in predictions of (a) natural circulation flow instabilities and
heat transfer; (b) condensation in presence of non-condensables;
(c) critical heat flux under oscillatory condition; and (d) thermal
stratification in large pools.
Natural circulation flow instabilities and heat transfer
While forced and natural circulation flow both are prone to insta-
bilities, natural circulation based systems are more unstable than
the forced circulation systems. This oscillatory behavior of natural
circulation is due to the non-linear behavior of natural circulation
phenomenon. In natural circulation systems, even a small change
in driving force affects the flow. The result of this disturbance in
turn affects the driving force and thus causes a regenerative feed-
back mechanism. So far, several attempts have been made to model
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flow instabilities using different two-phase flow models, which
range from the simplest HEM to more rigorous two fluid models.
There are concerns for using the models since the void velocity and
their distributions and the two-phase frictional pressure drops, are
found to affect the stability characteristics significantly (Nayak and
Vijayan, 2008). The most difficult part is to ensure the applicability
of best estimate codes like RELAP5 for modeling the flow stability
in natural circulation systems.
In a study by Taylor and Martin (1992), RELAP5/Mod3 pre-
dictions were compared with the experimental data for low flow
natural circulation. It was concluded that the trends of natural
circulation and forced circulations were predicted with an accept-
able degree of accuracy. However, a number of deficiencies were
observed in the RELAP5/ MOD3 treatment. These deficiencies
include geometric, multidimensional, and form loss effects.
In another study conducted by D’Auria et al. (1997), a com-
parison of RELAP5/Mod3.2 predictions for flow instabilities in a
simple natural circulation loop against the experiments conducted
for a range of power (100–900 W) was performed. According to
this comparative study, the performance of single-phase natural
circulation loop was predicted well by RELAP5; but this conclusion
was applicable only when a stable flow rate was established. How-
ever, it has to be noted that, the stability map predicted by RELAP
code had disagreements when compared with the experimental
stability map.
Misalea et al. (1999) have shown that both CATHARE and
RELAP codes, in absolute terms, showed poor agreement with
experimental data for simulation of natural circulation. In this
study, the CATHARE code was able to provide satisfactory results
for predicting the steady state at low power level, after the initial
transient. However, no unstable behavior was predicted. RELAP
code predictions were able to show the oscillating quantities; how-
ever, the power levels at which RELAP predicted these results, were
not same as the experimental observations.
Ambrosini and Ferreri (1998, 2003) assessed the effects of
truncation errors on prediction of linear stability boundaries in
single-phase natural circulation loop. Among some of the signif-
icant findings was, that for a given natural circulation problem,
the predicted stability map may considerably differ because of
truncation error propagating in the predictions. In this study, the
capability of system codes used in safety analysis of light-water
reactors was tested for predicting the stability using different first
order and second order, implicit and explicit numerical schemes. It
was found that second order schemes predicts well in comparison
to first order, also first order numerical scheme based system codes
are very much prone to the problems brought about by numerical
diffusion when applied to flow stability analysis.
RELAP5 predictions also are very sensitive to the nodalization.
In a study conducted by Mangal et al. (2012), a numerical simula-
tion was performed by using three different nodalization schemes
for an experimental facility (Kumar et al., 2000). The three dif-
ferent nodalization schemes were classified as coarse, base, and
fine. In this study, it was observed that choice of these nodaliza-
tion schemes plays a vital role in revealing the natural circulation
behavior. For single-phase flow, it was observed that for all the
three different nodalization schemes, RELAP5 simulation results
were very close to the experimental observations during the initial
heat up condition. However, during boiling two-phase conditions,
fine and coarse nodalization schemes resulted in over-predicting
the flow at different operating pressures. Whereas only base nodal-
ization scheme predicted results were closer to the experimental
results. It could be easily pointed out that RELAP5 prediction for
fine nodalizations had very high oscillation amplitude compared
to experimental data. With this study, it can be concluded that
there can be disparity in the predicted results using RELAP5 and
the experiments even if the most appropriate nodalization scheme
adopted. The disparity in the predicted results and experimental
data can be attributed to the constitutive relations used in RELAP5,
which are semi-empirical in nature (Mangal et al., 2012).
Condensation in presence of non-condensables
The effect of non-condensable gases on steam condensation is one
of the major safety-related issues, causing heat transfer rates to
decrease. Air and accidental presence of hydrogen represent the
main non-condensable gases in nuclear power plants. Best esti-
mate codes do have uncertainties in simulating the condensation
in presence of non-condensable. In an experimental validation
of RELAP5, Hassan and Raja (1993) found that for condensa-
tion in presence of non-condensable in U-tube, there were large
discrepancy in calculated primary temperatures for several cases
and also the nitrogen contents in the tube. Macedo and Tor-
res (2009) have shown that for horizontal condenser tubes of
an advanced nuclear reactor, RELAP5 code overestimates heat
transfer coefficients for the higher inlet air mass fraction and
hence calculated temperatures were smaller than experimental
data. Based on the comparison of results from experiments, Fahri
(2010) has observed that RELAP5/Mod3.3 cannot evaluate the
relationship between mixture Reynolds number and air accumu-
lation at interface leading to under-predicted wall sub-cooling
and over-predicted heat transfer coefficient with an unacceptable
deviation. While comparing RELAP simulation and experimental
results of OSU-MASLWR integral test facility, Nevo et al. (2012)
have reported that coupling the primary system containment and
the presence of non-condensable in the high pressure contain-
ment is challenging for RELAP code. So far, the present system
codes have accounted this phenomenon by using empirical rela-
tionships. For advanced design of NPP, including in particular
passive safety systems where the effect of the non-condensbale
gas is predominant, such approach will not be accurate enough
(Sarrette, 2003).
Critical heat flux under oscillatory condition
Critical heat flux (CHF) is a parameter of paramount importance,
which limits the heat transfer capability of nuclear reactors, heat
exchangers and many other heat transfer units. CHF has been
extensively investigated during the last few decades, resulting in
reasonable understanding of the phenomenon and several reliable
prediction models. Boiling systems can show various flow oscil-
lations under natural circulation and/or low-pressure conditions.
In water-cooled nuclear reactors, flow oscillations can occur in
natural circulation systems. It is well known that flow oscillations
can induce a premature CHF at the heat flux level much lower
than that for stable conditions. Though the use of natural circu-
lation systems is increased in advanced nuclear reactors and other
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heat transfer systems, the effect of flow oscillations on CHF has
not been sufficiently investigated and is not properly dealt with by
existing prediction models. The effects of flow oscillations, which
usually occur in actual systems at low pressure and low flow condi-
tions are not reliably handled in existing prediction models (Soon
Heung and Won-Pil, 2003).
Thermal stratification in large pools
Thermal mixing and stratification phenomena play major roles
for safety of reactor systems with large enclosures, such as post-
LOCA gas transport between containment compartments and
hydrogen distribution in operating LWRs, long-term passive con-
tainment cooling in AP1000, and steam condensation and mixing
in the suppression pool and isolation condenser pool of ESBWR.
It is important to accurately predict the temperature, density,
and/or concentration distributions for both design optimization
and safety analysis. However, the individual transport mechanisms
governing mixing in containments are characterized by time and
length scales that can differ by orders of magnitude. Large vol-
umes and complexity of the interactions of different flow and
thermal structures make analysis a daunting task. Current major
system analysis codes either have no models or only 0-D mod-
els for thermal mixing and stratification in large enclosures. The
lack of general thermal mixing and stratification models in those
codes severely limits their application and accuracy for safety
analysis, especially for passively safe advanced light-water reactors
(ALWRs), where the primary system and containments are more
strongly coupled (Zhao and Peterson, 2010). The SASSYS code
developed by argonne national laboratory (ANL), only provides
lumped-volume-based 0-D models that can only give very approx-
imate results and can only handle simple cases with one mixing
source (Dunn et al., 2006). COMMIX code developed by ANL
uses CFD tools to analyze simple configuration small-scale ther-
mal stratification problems and achieved limited success (Chang
and Bottoni, 1994; Kasza et al., 2007). However, the restrictiveness
and shortcomings of such applications have been recognized and
further research needed to extend the applications to large complex
pool mixing systems as highlighted in the review report by ANL
(Kasza et al., 2007). Considering the limitations of the inadequate
0-D methods and the inefficient 3-D CFD methods, new accu-
rate and efficient thermal mixing and stratification methods are
needed to improve accuracy and reduce modeling uncertainties,
especially for system safety analysis.
The uncertainty in these predictions could be only reduced by
verifying the codes for different passive systems and relying more
on experimental data. Treatment of the residual uncertainties (e.g.,
scaling uncertainties) when code validation data are available is an
important future task as well.
TREATMENT OF DYNAMIC FAILURE CHARACTERISTICS OF
COMPONENTS
The methods implemented so far for reliability assessment of pas-
sive systems do not consider dynamic failure of components or
process. In RMPS, variation of process parameters is considered
through a pdf treatment. These pdfs are assumed to be invariant in
time. In actual, the parameter variations from their nominal val-
ues could be time dependent. APSRA relies in calculating failure
probabilities of components for treatment of variation of process
parameters through classical fault tree and event tree. These meth-
ods only consider binary states of any component failure, i.e.,
failure or success states; however, the components like mechanical,
electrical, instruments, and control systems may fail at interme-
diate states. Examples of such components are control valves and
relief valves. These components may fail at 10% stuck open or
50% stuck open or at any other configurations, rather than just
stuck open or closed completely. Some components do not fail
directly; they fail after some considerable amount of time, while
degradation of function is taking place during accident progres-
sion or otherwise. For example, a control valve may get stuck open
at 10% and over the time it may transit to 100% open, during
which system might be working or may fail. It may so happen
that while one component is failing, it accelerates or induces some
other component failure, which in turn may lead to system failure
much before it is predicted.
To justify the effect of dynamism of failure of valves, let us take
an example of a benchmark problem (Aldemir, 1987; Deoss, 1989;
Cojazzi, 1996) details of which can be found in the Supplementary
Material. This system consists of a fluid containing tank, which has
three separate level control units. Figure 3 shows the diagram of
the system. Each control unit (control valve) is independent of the
others and has a separate level sensor associated with it. The level
sensors measure the fluid level in the tank, which is a continuous
process variable. Based on the information from the level sensors,
the operational state of the control units is determined. Each flow
control unit can be thought of as containing controller, which
turns the unit on or off based on the signal from the level sensors,
as shown in Figure 3. Failure of the system occurs when the tank
either runs dry or overflows. Two cases of particular interest are as
follows
• Case A – (Binary failure) Valves fail in either stuck open or stuck
closed positions.
FIGURE 3 | Hold-up tank (Benchmark problem).
Frontiers in Energy Research | Nuclear Energy October 2014 | Volume 2 | Article 40 | 8
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nayak et al. A review: passive system reliability analysis
• Case B – (degraded failure) Valves may fail at any intermedi-
ate positions with some certain probability and then the fault
increases at certain rate till the end of mission time or till the
valve completely fails open.
Probability of overflow and dryout in these two cases is evalu-
ated by methodology presented by Chandrakar et al. (2014). The
results shown in Figure 4 clearly explains that probabilities of
failure are very different when dynamism of valves are consid-
ered as compared to classical stuck open and stuck close fault
considerations.
In addition, classical PSA tools consider component failure
rates as constant. It is also assumed that these component fail-
ure rates represent the “useful life” region of the classical bath-
tub curve as shown in Figure 5 for a mechanical component
like valve. These failure rates are generally derived from the
component failure databases (IAEA, 1988; NSWC, 2006; MIL-
HDBK-217E, 1987). Failure rates based on these databases gen-
erally represent the failure of components, which are operating
within the designed limits and are independent of process para-
meter effects. During extreme events such as that happened in
Fukushima, components of passive systems may be subjected
to extreme stress and can have the failure rates, which are
much higher than the ones that are adopted from above data-
bases. In such cases, the entire bath-tub curve may be shifted
upward as shown in the Figure 6. Also, the process parame-
ter values at the time of operation will have a dominant effect
on these failure rates and also on the sequence of the failure
of components.
In view of the above, there is a need of dynamic reliability analy-
sis, which considers the evolution of process variable and their
effects on component failure rates in reliability analysis. Dynamic
reliability methods provide a framework for explicitly capturing
the influence of time and process dynamics on scenarios and con-
trol actions simultaneously. Dynamic reliability attempts to take
into account the ordering and timing of events in the accident
propagation, the dependence of transition rates and failure criteria
on the process variable values and human operator actions.
State-of-the-art development on dynamic reliability methodologies
and application to passive system reliability analysis
In order to have a realistic estimation of passive systems reliabil-
ity, it is needed to capture the interactions between the hardware
states/operator actions with dynamic evolution of process parame-
ters. This can be achieved by integrating the methods for dynamic
reliability, also known as dynamic PSA methods with currently
developed methodologies for passive system reliability analysis.
Dynamic reliability analysis methods can be broadly categorized
as (a) state transitions or Markov models; (b) continuous dynamic
event trees (DETs); (c) direct simulation.
A review of the dynamic reliability methodology development
reveals that the first comprehensive continuous-time method is
the continuous-event tree (CET) approach (Devooght and Smidts,
1992a,b; Smidts, 1992). This approach captures the interrelation
FIGURE 4 | Cumulative probability plot of benchmark problem.
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FIGURE 5 | Bath-tube curve for mechanical components.
FIGURE 6 | Bath-tube curve during severe accidental conditions.
between the hardware/software with operator actions by using
an integral equation, which can be solved by Monte Carlo simu-
lation techniques. To account for the shortcomings of the CET
method, continuous cell-to-cell mapping (CCMT) (Tombuyes
and Aldemir, 1996) and stimulus-driven theory of probabilis-
tic dynamics (Labeau and Izquierdo, 2005) were developed and
implemented. Since continuous time based methods are very
computationally intensive, they could not be applied success-
fully to highly complex problems of real world. To overcome
these computational issues, a discrete version of this method was
developed (Aldemir, 2013). Currently, the DETs are the most pop-
ular approach to discrete-time dynamic PSA. Dynamical logical
methodology (DYLAM) (Amendola and Reina, 1984; Cacciabue
et al., 1986; Cojazzi, 1996) is the first methodology proposed that
uses DETs.
The software that are available for discrete-time dynamic prob-
abilistic safety analysis are ADS-IDAC (Chang and Mosleh, 1998),
DENDROS (Munoz et al., 1999), MCDET (Hofer et al., 2002),
ADAPT (Catalyurek et al., 2010), ADAPT (Catalyurek et al., 2010),
and GA-DPRA (Voroyev and Kudinov, 2011). However, these tools
suffer the problem of handling and processing the huge amount of
data generated during the analysis and they are computationally
intensive.
Integration of dynamic reliability analysis with T-H models is
needed for the realistic evaluation of passive systems reliability. In
order to enhance capability of the present methodologies to cap-
ture the interaction between process parameters and dynamical
evolution of system state, it is thus required to use the dynamic
reliability methodologies like discrete DETs and advanced Monte
Carlo simulations.
Integration of dynamic reliability methodologies in RMPS and
APSRA
Reliability methods for passive safety functions follow classical
event tree approach for integrating the passive system failure
probability into PSA. As said earlier, passive systems performance
and reliability heavily depends on the initial conditions, which
in RMPS methodology, is considered only for a particular event
sequence. However, in real accidental and transient situations, the
boundary conditions, and process parameter variations may not
necessarily follow the predicted event sequence considered in a
classical event tree. The event sequence in actual can be very
dynamic. This dynamism of accident and transients can be attrib-
uted to several factors like varying operating conditions of reactor,
subjective decisions of operator, hardware failure or their degra-
dation with respect to time, and sever conditions generated by
some unpredicted natural events like tsunami, earthquake, etc.
It is to be noted here, even though passive systems do not need
any human intervention for their operation, still the effect of sub-
jective decisions of operator for other active systems working in
combination with passive systems can have an adverse effect on
passive system performance and reliability. In order to capture this
dynamism in RMPS methodology, event trees must be replaced
with discrete DETs, which can capture the combinations of inter-
action between the different scenarios with varying conditions of
hardware functionalities and effects of human intervention. In
addition, considering a time invariant pdf for all the process para-
meters (for example, atmospheric temperature) must be corrected
accordingly. Since, RMPS methodology, in itself does not consider
hardware/component failure or their degradation in passive sys-
tem reliability evaluation, the dynamism in failure characteristics
of hardware/components cannot be accounted in current version
of RMPS.
In APSRA methodology, fault tree representation of passive
system is used to integrate it with the PSA. In addition, the
hardware failure states considered in this methodology does
not capture their dynamic failure behavior. In order to cap-
ture the overall dynamic behavior of passive system, APSRA
methodology, must incorporate the dynamic reliability method-
ology in propagating the effect of component and hardware
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failures with respect to time. In addition to the incorporation
of dynamic reliability methodology for the hardware failure or
degradation, fault tree representation must be modified to dis-
crete dynamic event tree to capture the dynamic accident scenario
and human errors.
TREATMENT OF INDEPENDENT PROCESS PARAMETERS VARIATIONS
IN PASSIVE SYSTEM RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
Broadly, the parameters affecting passive system performance
can be classified into two types: (a) dependent parameters and
(b) independent parameters. Dependent parameters are the ones
whose deviations depend upon the output or state of certain
hardware or control units, example of such dependent parame-
ters are pressure, sub-cooling, non-condensable gas. Many of
dependent parameters are not independent to have their own
deviations; rather they are correlated or interdependent (Burgazzi,
2009). Independent parameters are the ones whose deviations
do not depend upon certain components rather they have their
own patterns and deviations, which cannot be predicted eas-
ily; example of such parameter is atmospheric temperature. The
FIGURE 7 | Inlet water temperature variation for experimental natural circulation loop at BARC.
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dependence of system performance on these types of parameter
is quite significant in many passive systems for example passive
decay heat removal system. Performance of these systems is very
sensitive to the water inlet temperature (sink temperature) or
atmospheric temperature or the environment temperature. These
parameters vary in time due to their evolution along the mis-
sion period of system operation. Environment temperature has
certain pattern depending on the season and time of operation
(day/night) and some random variations on that; so it cannot
be called as an uncertain parameter and treated by a random
probability distribution between minimum and maximum for
the analysis purpose. Treatment of dynamic variation of such
kind of parameters is another unresolved problem in reliabil-
ity analysis of passive systems. As an example, let us look at
the inlet water temperature variation (Figure 7) for one of the
natural circulation experimental facility in BARC (Jain et al.,
2010), which depends on the ambient condition. One can eas-
ily infer from the data that this water temperature has seasonal
and temporal variations.
To resolve the uncertainties in the reliability calculations
because of assumptions around the parameters like atmospheric
temperature, one has to build the models of such parameters from
the data that has been continuously monitored around the appli-
cations of passive systems. These parameters could be given as
real-time data into the simulations once the models are built.
CONCLUSION
Many of the advanced reactor concepts propose to adopt passive
safety systems in order to enhance the defense-in-depth and make
nuclear power plants inherently safe even during extreme events
like earthquake, tsunami, and floods. Passive safety systems are
believed to be more reliable than the active safety systems because
of elimination of the need for human intervention, avoidance of
external electrical supply, etc. However, incorporation of these sys-
tems in the nuclear reactors needs to be tested adequately due to
several technical issues; for example:
• lack of plant operational experience;
• scarcity of adequate experimental data from integral test facil-
ities or from separate effect tests in order to understand the
performance characteristics of these passive systems, not only at
normal operation but also during accidents and transients;
• lack of accepted definitions of failure modes for these systems;
and,
• difficulty in modeling certain physical behavior of these systems.
Evaluation of passive system reliability is a challenging task. It
involves a clear understanding of the physics of the phenomena
and failure mechanism of the system, which the designer must do
before prediction of its reliability. Currently, the performance of
passive systems and their failure are predicted by so called “best
estimate codes.” However, the applicability of the “best estimate
codes” to assess the performance and failure of passive systems is
not well established due to the lack of sufficient plant/experimental
data. That introduces large uncertainties and errors when such
codes are applied to evaluate passive system performance.
A historical review shows that a few methodologies such as,
REPAS, RMPS, and APSRA have been developed in the past and
applied to evaluate reliability of passive systems. It is observed that
while these methodologies have certain features in common; but
they differ significantly particularly in the treatment of deviations
of process parameters from their nominal values and model uncer-
tainty in best estimate codes which are paramount for evaluation
of reliability of such systems.
Passive system performance is greatly affected by devia-
tions of process parameters from their nominal values. During
extreme events, evolution of these process parameter values may
increase/decrease the event occurrence probabilities and failure
rate of components. In addition, components of passive systems
can fail at any intermediate positions of operations instead of clas-
sical assumption of binary state failure. Current methodologies
lack treatment of these dynamic failure characteristics of compo-
nents of passive systems. It is also required to pay attention to the
treatment of dynamic variations of independent process parame-
ters such as atmospheric temperature in passive system reliability
analysis in future.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
The Supplementary Material for this article can be found online
at http://www.frontiersin.org/Journal/10.3389/fenrg.2014.00040/
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